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DISAGGREGATION IN DETERRENCE  
AND DEATH PENALTY RESEARCH:  
THE CASE OF MURDER IN  
CHICAGO  
WILLIAM C. BAILEY* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The proper role, if any, of capital punishment in our criminal jus-
tice system is an issue of unparalleled discussion in professional litera-
ture. Over one thousand books, articles, and reports on one or more 
aspects of the death penalty question have appeared since the turn of 
the century. In addition, the death penalty debate is not confined solely 
to professional circles; it occupies a prominent role in the popular press, 
media, and periodicals. In fact, the literature is so voluminous and the 
moral, legal, ethical, and empirical issues involved are so diverse and 
complex, that even the most recognized contemporary authorities on 
capital punishment readily acknowledge the limitations of their knowl-
edge and understanding. 1 
The death penalty issue that is the focus of the greatest discussion 
and polarization both in professional and lay literature is the question of 
deterrence: does capital punishment deter crime, and most notably, 
murder? More properly and practically stated, does capital punishment 
provide a more effective general deterrent to murder than alternative 
legal sanctions such as imprisonment? 
Social scientists-most notably sociologists and criminologists-
have played a long and active role in addressing this question empiri-
cally, with all studies up until the mid-1970's rejecting the deterrence 
hypothesis for capital punishment. For example, over five decades of 
research in this country failed to show higher murder rates in abolition 
than death penalty states, an increase in the murder rate after some 
states abolished capital punishment, or a decrease in murder after some 
* Professor of Sociology, Cleveland State University; Ph.D., Sociology, Washington State 
University, 1971; B.S., Central Washington State University, 1966. 
1 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1982); T. SELLIN, THE PENALTY 
OF DEATH (1980). 
jurisdictions reinstated the death penalty, all of which the deterrence 
hypothesis predicts.2 In addition, both longitudinal and cross-sectional 
examinations of actual execution rates and murder rates in retentionist 
jurisdictions failed to show a significant inverse relationship between 
these two factors as the deterrence hypothesis predicts. 3 
These studies, along with additional anecdotal information from 
noted prison wardens and chaplains,4 psychiatrists,5 and convicted mur-
derers6 brought most social scientists to what Sellin has termed the "in-
evitable" conclusion that capital punishment, in either law or practice, 
has no discernible effect as a deterrent to murder.7 The prevailing opin-
ion was expressed by Barnes and Teeters when they claimed that deter-
rence justifications for capital punishment are but "rationalizations of 
revenge. "8 
Despite the presumed conclusiveness of the evidence against the 
death penalty as a deterrent to murder,9 and the anti-capital punish-
ment attitude held by most social scientists, the deterrence question be-
came a lively area of debate in the professional literature during the 
middle of the last decade. At least four major factors appear to be re-
sponsible for the return of the deterrence question to prominence in the 
social science and legal literature during this period: 10 (1) a growing the-
oretical and empirical interest in the general deterrence doctrine, which 
stemmed in large part from Gibbs' 11 and Becker's12 critiques of the anti-
punishment and anti-deterrence attitudes held by many social scientists; 
(2) a growing awareness of the theoretical and methodological complex-
2 H. BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1967); R. BYE, CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1919); C. KIRKPATRICK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1925); T. 
SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY (1959); Dann, The .Deti!TTent Eiftct of Capzial Punishment, 29 
FRIENDS Soc. SERV. REV. 1 (1935); Reckless, The Use ofthe .Death Penalty, 15 CRIME & DE-
LINQ. 43 (1969); Schuessler, The .Deti!TTentlnjluence ofthe .Death Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952); 
Sutherland, Murder and the .Death Penalty, 15 J. AM. lNST. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 522 
(1925); Void, Can the .Death Penalty Prevent Cnine?, 12 PRISON J., Oct. 1932, at 4. 
3 T. SELLIN, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT (1967); Bailey, Murder and Capzial Punishment: Some 
Further Evidence, 45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 669 (1975); Schuessler, supra note 2. 
4 C. DUFFY & A. HIRSHBERG, 88 MEN AND 2 WOMEN (1962); L. LAWES, MAN'S jUDG-
MENT OF DEATH (1924). 
5 D. j. WEST, MURDER FOLLOWED BY SUICIDE (1965). 
6 C. CHESSMAN, CELL 2455, DEATH Row (1954). 
7 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 138 (1967). 
8 H. E. BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 355 (1951). 
9 A contrary view cannot be found in a simple criminology textbook published in this 
country from the turn of the century up until the mid-1970's. 
10 See genera/f)!, H. BEDAU, supra note 1; T. SELLIN, supra note 1; Bailey, .Deti!TTence and the 
Celeniy if the .Death Penalty: A Neglected Q;ustion in .Deti!TTence Research, 58 Soc. FORCES 1308 
( 1980); Gibbs, Preventive Eiftcts ifCapzial Punishment Other Than .Deti!TTence, 14 GRIM. L. BULL. 34 
(1978). 
II Gibbs, Cnine, Punishment, and .Deti!TTence, 48 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 515 (1968). 
12 Becker, Cnine and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169 (1968). 
ity of the deterrence issue and the serious shortcomings (both theoretical 
and methodological) of previous deterrence studies; (3) complaints by 
the United States Supreme Court in two important decisions13 about 
the lack of recent, clear-cut evidence on the deterrent effect of capital 
punishment; and (4) the publication of a highly controversial article by 
Isaac Ehrlich in 1975 which (a) dismissed as methodologically naive and 
meaningless over five decades of previous death penalty research, and 
(b), of equal importance, reported certainty of execution to be a very 
significant deterrent to murder. 14 Examining national execution and 
homicide data for various periods between 1933 and 1969, Ehrlich con-
cluded that "an additional execution per year over the period in ques-
tion may have resulted on average, in 7 or 8 fewer murders."15 
Moreover, in a study which followed soon after Ehrlich's and which 
used similar econometric techniques to examine national murder and 
execution data for various periods between 1933 and 1972, Yunker 
reached the conclusion that "one execution will deter 156 murders."16 
While both Ehrlich's and Yunker's studies have come under intense 
scrutiny and are now considered totally discredited by most authori-
ties,17 their work and the additional factors noted above brought to the 
forefront an awareness of the complexity of the deterrence question and 
the need for a more sophisticated methodology than was employed in 
earlier studies. 
II. SUMMARY OF RECENT RESEARCH 
The mid-1970's saw a movement in research on the deterrent value 
of the death penalty away from the traditional practice of simply exam-
ining the bivariate relationship between (1) the presence or absence of 
capital punishment and variation in state homicide rates, and/or (2) the 
13 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
14 Ehrlich, The Deti!TTmt Ejftct of Capzia! Punishmmt: A Qjtestion ofLift and Death, 65 AM. 
EcON. REV. 397 (1975). 
15 /d. at 414. 
16 Yunker, Is the Death Pmalty a Deti!TTmt to HomiCide? Some Time Series Evzdence, 5 J. BEHAV. 
EcoN., Summer 1976, at 45. 
17 See, e.g. , Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion ofDeti!TTence iiz Isaac Ehrlich~ Research on Capzial 
Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 187 (1975); Brier & Fienberg, Recent Economdnc Madding ofCnine and 
Punishment: Support .for the Deti!TTmce Hypothesis?, 4 EVALUATION REV. 147 (1980); Forst, The 
DI!II!TTent Ejftct ofCapzial Punishment: A Cross-State Ana(ysis ofthe 1960~, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 
(1977); Friedman, The Use ofMultiple Regression Ana(ysis to Test .for a Deti!TTmt E.fftct of Capzial 
Punishment: Prospects andProblems, in 1 CRIMINOLOGY REVIEW YEARBOOK 61 (S. Messinger & 
E. Bittner eds. 1979); Klein, Forst & Filatov, The DI!II!TTent E.fftct ofCapital Punishment: An As­
sessment ofthe Estzinates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: EsTIMATING THE EFFECTS 
OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (A. Blumstein,]. Cohen & D. Nagin eds. 1978); 
Passell & Taylor, The DI!II!TTent E.fftct ofCapital Punishment: Another View, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 
445 (1977); P. Passell & J. Taylor, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another 
View (Feb. 1975) (unpublished manuscript). 
simple correlation between execution rates and homicide rates for death 
penalty jurisdictions. It became apparent that an adequate test of the 
deterrence hypothesis would have to incorporate as control variables ad-
ditional factors associated with murder rates to properly identify the 
possible effect of the provision and level of use of the death penalty. 18 
To do otherwise is to examine murder in an etiological vacuum and run 
the risk of spurious results. 
Thus, the second half of the 1970's through 1980 saw over a dozen 
multivariate deterrence studies. 19 These studies were primarily of two 
forms: (1) cross-sectional examinations of state execution and murder 
rates for selected years,20 or (2) time-series analyses of the relationship 
between execution and murder rates at either the national or state 
level.21 
With but two exceptions,22 this new round of research found no 
support for the hypothesis that either the provision for capital punish-
ment or the certainty of execution had a significant deterrent effect on 
murder. Moreover, some investigations attempted to replicate and ver-
ify Ehrlich's opposite findings. 23 In general, the conclusion was that 
Ehrlich's confirmation of the deterrence hypothesis was simply a result 
of his applying a number of arbitrary, and in some cases dubious, as-
sumptions and procedures in his analysis.24 
18 Ehrlich made this clear in 1975. Ehrlich, supra note 14.  
19 These studies typically used multiple regression.  
20 Bailey, supra note 10; Bailey, A Mu!tivanate Cross-Sectional Analysis ofthe Deterrent E.ffict of 

the Death Penalf)!, 69 Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 183 (1980); Bailey, lmpn'sonment v. the Death Pen­
a/f)' as a Deterrent to Murder, 1 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 239 (1977); Black & Orsagh, New Evidence 
on the Ejjicacy ofSanctions as Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q 616 (1978); Ehrlich, Captia! 
Punishment and Deterrence: Some Further Thoughts and Addtiiona/ Evidence, 85 J. POL. EcoN. 741 
(1977); Forst, supra note 17; Kleck, Captia! Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. 
Soc. 882 (1979); Passell, The Deterrent E.ffict ofthe Death Penalf)': A Statistical Test, 28 STAN. L. 
REV. 61 (1975); Yunker, supra note 16. 
21 Bailey, The Deterrent E.ffict of the Death Penalf)': An Extended Time-Smes Analyst's, 10 
OMEGA 235 (1979-80); Bailey, The Deterrent E.ffict ofthe Death Penalf)! for Murder in Ohio: A Tzine­
Smes Analyst's, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1979); Bailey, Deterrent Ejftct ofthe Death Penalf)' for 
Murder in Ca!ifomta, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 743 (1979); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalf)' for 
Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 67 (1979); Bailey, An Analysts ofthe Deterrent E.ffict of 
the Death Penalf)' tiz North Carolziza, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1978); Bailey, Deterrence and the Death 
Penalf)'for Murder iiz Utah: A Tzine-Smes Analysis, 5 J. CONTEMP. L. 1 (1978); Bowers & Pierce, 
Deterrence or Brutalization: What Is the E.ffict ofExecutions?, 26 CRIME & DEL1NQ. 453 (1980); 
Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; King, The Brutalization E.ffict: Execution Publzcif)' and the lnct'dencl! 
ofHomt'ct'dniz South Carolziza, 57 Soc. FoRCES 683 (1978); Kleck,supra note 20; Klein, Forst & 
Filatov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17; W. Bowers & G. Pierce, Deterrence, 
Brutalization or Nonsense? (1975) (unpublished manuscript). 
22 Ehrlich, supra note 20; Yunker, supra note 16. 
23 Ehrlich, supra note 14. 
24 W. Bowers & G. Pierce, supra note 21 (unpublished manuscript); Bowers & Pierce, supra 
note 17, at 187-208; Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst & 
Filatov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17. 
By the same token, however, a number of recent investigators are 
quick to point out that, despite these rather consistent findings, there is 
also no conclusive evidence that capital punishment is not, or cannot be, 
an effective deterrent to murder.25 Although the evidence to date does 
not, on balance, show a significant deterrent effect, even recent death 
penalty research suffers from some important methodological limita-
tions that prevent us from concluding that capital punishment does not 
have a significant deterrent effect on murder. Until these remaining 
methodological issues are resolved,26 the deterrence question will remain 
an unresolved matter.27 
III. PROBLEMS OF AGGREGATION AND MEASUREMENT BIAS 
In at least three important areas, both earlier and more recent de-
terrence studies suffer from bias because of the highly aggregated nature 
of the data being examined.28 First, with few exceptions, the only type 
of homicide subject to the death penalty is premeditated murder.29 
However, not a single deterrence study has examined the relationship 
between the provision and/or level of use of capital punishment and 
first-degree murder rates. Rather, previous studies typically either (1) 
operationalized their dependent variable as homicide, and have made use 
of figures compiled by the United States Public Health Service, or (2) 
operationalized their dependent variable as murder and non-negligent man­
slaughter, and made use of data compiled by the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation (FBI). This practice is necessary because no public or 
private agency gathers nationwide data on premeditated murder.30 
In using the more inclusive homicide and murder data in death 
25 Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra 
note 17. 
26 Most of these issues involve potential problems of aggregation and measurement bias. 
See i'nfta notes 28-44 and accompanying text. 
27 N. KriTRIE & E. ZENOFF, SANCTIONS, SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 31 (1981); 
Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17 at 187-88; Friedman, supra note 17, at 71-85; Klein, Forst & 
Filatov, supra note 17, at 357-59. 
28 N. KriTRIE & E. ZENOFF, supra note 27, at 341. 
29 Premeditated murder is variously referred to as first-degree murder, murder I, and ag-
gravated murder. 
30 In state statutes, first-degree murder typically includes both the elements of premedita-
tion and malice aforethought. In general terms, premeditation refers to an intent to violate 
the law which is formulated prior to the activity, while malice aforethought refers to the 
simple presence of an intent to kill at the time of the act. The homicide category of murder 
and non-negligent manslaughter used by the FBI includes "all willful felonious homicides as 
distinguished from deaths caused by negligence," FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES--UNIFORM CRIME REPORT-1967, AT 61 (1968), AND THE 
PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE defines homicide as "a death resulting from an injury purposely 
inflicted by another person," with intent to kill not required to classify a death as a homicide. 
U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES: 1950-1964 at 9 (1967). 
penalty studies, it is commonly assumed that the ratio of first degree 
murders to homicides or murder and non-negligent manslaughters is 
constant, so that the latter types of figures provide a reasonably good 
indicator of capital offenses. As Sellin31 and Bedau32 have pointed out, 
however, this is only an assumption. There is no hard evidence to justify 
this practice. Accordingly, until more refined murder data are ex-
amined, the extent of bias present in previous studies will remain an 
important but unresolved question.33 
A second potential area of bias in death penalty studies stems from 
the type of political/geographic bodies used as the units of analysis or 
measurement. For instance, in a number of recent studies researchers 
have examined the correspondence between aggregate execution rates 
and homicide or murder rates on a national level for various time peri-
ods, most commonly from the 1930's through the late 1960's. These 
studies are seriously flawed because no attention has been paid to (1) the 
tremendous state-to-state variation in offense rates during these years, 
(2) the considerable variation in execution rates from state to state in 
retentionist jurisdictions, and the fact that execution rates, by definition, 
were zero in abolitionist states, and (3) the tremendous variation from 
state to state in the sociodemographic and other control variables intro-
duced into the analysis. These studies have simply treated this impor-
tant variation as if it does not exist. Moreover, and with particular 
reference to Ehrlich's study,34 measurement error problems for an execu-
tion rate variable are very serious when homicide and execution data 
are aggregated at the national level. In such a situation, even slight 
measurement error may contribute to a spurious negative relationship 
between execution and murder rates.35 
Because of these problems, it appears that states are a preferable 
unit of analysis in time-series as well as cross-sectional designs. Even 
aggregation at the state level, however, may result in substantial error 
and possible bias.36 For example, it has long been observed that murder 
rates are much higher in some areas of a state than in others,37 but com-
31 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 135. 
32 H. Bedau, supra note 2, at 36. 
33 N. KIITR!E & E. ZENOFF, supra note 27; Brier & Feinberg, supra note 17; Friedman, 
supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 17. 
34 Ehrlich, supra note 14. 
35 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; Bowers & Pierce, Detemmce, Brutalization or NoTISellSe?, 
supra note 21; Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17; Friedman, supra note 17; Klein, Forst & Fi-
latov, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, supra note 17. 
36 Greenberg, Deterrence Research and Social Poli{:y, in MODELING THE CRIMINAL jUSTICE 
SYSTEM (S. Nagel ed. 1977); Logan, Arrest Rates and Deterrence, 56 Soc. Sci. Q. 376 (1975); 
Orsagh, Empirical Cnmii10logy: Interpreting Results Dmvedftom Aggregate Data, 16 J. RESEARCH 
CRIME & DEL!NQ. 294 (1979). 
37 For example, there are often such differences between urban and rural areas of a state. 
puting murder rates at the state level disguises this important variation. 
Similarly, the ratio of executions to murders varies considerably be-
tween areas within many retentionist states,38 but aggregate execution 
rates ignore this variation. Finally, the very same difficulties are present 
when sociodemographic and other control variables are measured at the 
state level, and this is particularly a problem when very heterogeneous 
jurisdictions are considered. 
The possibility of bias in using state-wide data is confirmed by a 
recent study by Greenberg, Kessler, and Logan,39 which found that the 
relationship between arrest rates and rates for major felonies (including 
murder) varies considerably depending upon whether states or cities are 
used as the unit of analysis. The study found considerable aggregation 
bias in the state level analysis.40 It remains to be seen, however, whether 
this pattern holds when cities are used as the unit of analysis in death 
penalty studies. Such an analysis is the next logical step in death pen-
alty research. 41 
A third source of potential aggregation and measurement bias 
comes from the typical practice of using one-year time intervals (nor-
mally the calendar year) in computing murder and execution rates and 
examining the correspondence between them. This practice is necessary 
because homicide and murder data available for death penalty studies 
are generally only reported on a calendar year basis, rather than a 
monthly, weekly or daily basis. Similarly, until the publication of the 
complete Teeters-Zibulka Inventory of executions under state author-
ity,42 only annual execution figures were available from periodic publi-
cations released by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. 
The primary problems that result from examining yearly execution 
and offense data are threefold. First, the deterrent effect of capital pun-
ishment may be short-term and have its major impact on the rate of 
murder within the month or two after execution.43 This remains an 
open question, but if this is the case, then examining yearly murder data 
will have the effect of disguising or diluting the impact of executions. 
38 W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 202-401 (1974). 
39 Greenberg, Kessler & Logan, Aggregation Bias iiz .Deterrence Research: An Empirical Ana(J­
sis, 18 j. RESEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 128 (1981). 
40 For the same reasons, a growing number of investigators have moved from using states 
to using either cities or counties as their units of analysis in examining the deterrent effect of 
arrest and imprisonment practices. Brown, A"est Rates and Cnine Rates: When .Does a Tippzizg 
Ejftct Occur?, 57 Soc. FORCES 671 (1978); Greenberg, Kessler & Logan, supra note 39; Green-
berg, Kessler & Logan, A Pand Modd ofCnine Rates and Amst Rates, 44 AM. Soc. REv. 843 
(1979); Tittle & Rowe, Certaziz{y ofA"ests and Cnine Rates: A Further Test ofthe .Deterrence Hypothe­
sis, 52 Soc. FORCES 455 (1974). 
41 N. K.ittrie & E. Zenoff,supra note 27, at 341. 
42 W. BOWERS, supra note 38, at 200. 
43 Bowers & Pierce, .Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21. 
Second, when executions and murders are considered on a calendar 
year basis, it becomes very difficult to properly establish the temporal 
sequence between these two factors. To illustrate, it would make little 
sense to expect an execution carried out during December of year t to be 
much evidenced in the annual twelve-month murder rate for year t. 
This is obvious because eleven months worth of murders during year t 
occurred before the execution. Rather, the deterrent effect of such an 
execution could only be felt during December of year t and possibly, for 
the reasons noted above, during the first few months of year t + 1. 
Some investigators have tried to deal with the possible delayed de-
terrent effect of executions by building in a one-year time lag between 
executions (year t) and murders (year t + 1). However, whether this 
procedure is employed in a time-series or cross-sectional design, the diffi-
culty is the same: there is no assurance that the actual time lag between 
executions and the murder rate is the same. To illustrate, for both State 
A and State B, murder rates for year t + 1 are being examined, but the 
last execution during year t in State A may have been in January, 
whereas the last execution during year t in State B may have been in 
December. Here, the actual time lags being considered for the two hypo-
thetical states differ by about one year. This is obviously an extreme 
example posing the maximum possible difference. The fact remains, 
however, that states have been far from uniform in their monthly execu-
tion practices,44 and the possible bias resulting from previous studies 
which rely upon yearly execution and murder data cannot be ignored. 
IV. THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION 
In this investigation we attempt to overcome each of the above ag-
gregation and measurement error problems by providing a monthly 
time-series analysis of executions and first-degree murders in the city of 
Chicago, Illinois for the period 1915-1921.45 Although these first-degree 
murder and execution data are now somewhat dated, their importance 
in providing a clearer understanding of the possible deterrent effect of 
executions on capital homicides is not diminished. Moreover, if deter-
rence is a communication effect as Gibbs46 and others contend, then 
Chicago provides an ideal research setting since there is close geographic 
proximity between the place where first-degree murders are committed 
44 Teeters & Zibulka, Executions Under State Authority: /861-1967, in W. BOWERS, EXECU-
TIONS IN AMERICA 200, 202 (1974). 
45 This analysis is made possible by the availability of unpublished execution figures for 
Cook County Prison compiled by Hans Mattrick, its former assistant warden, which have 
been provided to me by Thorsten Sellin, and monthly first-degree murder data covering the 
seven-year period reported by the Chicago Police Department in its annual reports. 
46 J. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975). 
and the place where the convicted murderers are executed. In many 
states, executions are performed in facilities that are far removed from 
major population centers where the majority of murders occur. In con-
trast, in Chicago every convicted murderer executed during the period 
under study was put to death in the Cook County Prison located in the 
city. Accordingly, Chicago residents, including would-be killers, should 
have had a more direct awareness of murder and its possible conse-
quence (the certainty of execution) than residents of larger jurisdictions 
such as states or the nation. 
A. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
1. Method ofAna{ysis 
In examining the deterrent effect of executions on first-degree 
murders in Chicago, we use the following general model:47 
FM =(EXEC, ARR, PRIS, DEN, PUB, SEA). 
This model represents the hypothesis that the monthly number of first-
degree murders (FM) is a function of the number of executions for first-
degree murder (EXEC); the certainty of arrest for murder I (ARR); the 
certainty of imprisonment for murder I (PRIS); population density 
(DEN); the percent of the city's budget expended on public assistance 
for the homeless and other needy adults and children (PUB); and the 
season of the year (SEA). Previous research has found sociodemographic 
and seasonal variables included on the right-hand side of the equation, 
or similar ones, to be associated with murder rates, and they are consid-
47 Although we pose, theoretically, d~terrence as the causal connection between executions 
and murder, Gibbs, supra note 10, claims that the normative validation effect of executions also 
has to be considered. See J. GIBBS, supra note 46. Normative validation "occurs when an 
individual's condemnation of some type of criminal act is maintained as a consequence of 
prescribed legal punishments or their application to other individuals." Gibbs, supra note 10, 
at 40. In the case of capital punishment, executions could affect, theoretically, the rate of 
murder either through deterrence or normative validation. That is, both arguments predict 
an inverse relationship between the level of executions and the level of murder. W. BERNS, 
FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE MORALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY 145 
(1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL 
QUESTION 70 (1975); Lehtinen, The Value ofLife: An Argumentfor the .Death Penallj', 23 CRIME 
& DELINQ. 237 (1977); van den Haag, On n~terrence and the .Death Penallj', 60 J. GRIM. L., 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 141 (1969). According to Gibbs, supra note 10, and Brier & 
Fienberg, supra note 17, however, there apparently is no feasible way of separating the possi-
ble deterrent from normative validation effects of capital punishment. 
Whereas Gibbs, supra notes 10 & 46, is adamant in drawing a distinction between the 
deterrent and normative validation effects ofsanctions, most researchers have adopted a more 
flexible conceptualization that incorporates both deterrence and normative validation under 
the phrase "general deterrence." C. TITTLE, SANCTIONS AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE: THE 
QUESTION OF DETERRENCE (1980). Because this is the more ,common usage in the death 
penalty literature, and for reasons of brevity in our discussion, we shall use the term deter-
rence to also incorporate the possible normative validation effect of executions on murder. 
ered here as control factors to avoid spurious results for the execution 
variable. In addition, and for the same reasons, certainty of arrest and 
imprisonment for murder are also included in the model as control fac-
tors. Some previous investigations have found certainty of arrest and 
imprisonment to be negatively, and significantly, associated with homi-
cide rates. 
At first glance, it appears that our model ignores some possibly im-
portant sociodemographic factors associated w~th murder. For example, 
some previous investigations found a very significant relationship be-
tween murder rates and such factors as percent of population that is 
nonwhite, percent of male population fifteen to thirty-four years of age, 
and percent of population foreign born. These factors were considered 
for possible inclusion in our model, but they were rejected because of the 
high degree of multicollinearity they would have introduced into the 
analysis. The association among these factors would have resulted in 
very unreliable parameter estimates coming from the regression 
analysis.48 
Although a theoretical argument can be made for including each of 
these three sociodemographic factors in the analysis, their high degree of 
correspondence precludes including even two of them in the model. In 
addition, if we decide to include only one of these variables in the analy-
sis, the obvious questions become which one, and whether the resulting 
findings should be interpreted as indicating the effects of race, age/sex, 
or foreign born population on murders. 
Rather than make such an arbitrary decision, all three factors are 
excluded from the model, but their possible effect on murder is not to-
tally ignored. The population density factor included in the model is 
very highly correlated with the nonwhite population (r = .950), male 
population fifteen to thirty-four years of age (r = -.969) and the foreign 
born population (r = -.999) variables. Accordingly, population density 
can be viewed as a proxy variable for changes in Chicago in these three 
sociodemographic areas, besides having its own theoretical justification 
for consideration. 
To examine the effect of executions on first-degree murders, a series 
of multiple regression analyses were performed where various execution 
measures and time-lag structures were considered. In addition, more 
general monthly homicide figures, similar to those included in the FBI's 
category of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, were considered in 
the analysis for comparative purposes and to determine the impact of 
48 For nonwhite population and male population 15 to 34 years of age, r = -.991; for 
nonwhite population and percent of population foreign born, r = -.947; for male population 
15 to 34 years of age and percent of population foreign born, r = .946. 
executions on total criminal homicides in Chicago.49 
2 The Dependent Variables 
For each year, 1915 through 1921, monthly (n = 84) first-degree 
murder figures were taken from the annual statistical reports of the Chi-
cago Police Department.50 Under Illinois law during this period, first-
degree (premeditated) murder was the only type of homicide eligible for 
capital punishment. The type of indictment reached by the Cook 
County Grand Jury determined how killings were classified in the police 
reports. 
Figures for total criminal homicides (including first-degree 
murders) were also extracted from the annual Chicago police reports in 
order to examine the effect of executions on all types of criminal homi-
cides.51 Although most of these homicides would not lead to the death 
penalty, the moralizing, normative validation, and educative effect of 
executions may also reduce noncapital homicides.52 Indeed, the major 
function of the threat and application of criminal law may lie in its 
moral and educative role in society.53 
49 To test for possible problems of multicollinearity, we examined our basic model with 
each execution variable using the variance decomposition method developed in A. BELSLEY, 
E. KuH & R. WELSCH, REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS: IDENTIFYING INFLUENTIAL DATA AND 
SoURCES OF CoLLINEARITY (1980). This analysis did not indicate any significant col-
linearity problems. Interestingly, population density is the factor most strongly associated 
with the number of executions (r = .448) and the execution dummy variable (r" = .453). 
However, this does not pose a problem in the analysis either by itself or in linear combination 
with the other predictor variables. When the number of executions is regressed against the 
other five right-hand variables included in the murder I analysis, a significant (p < .01) R2 
value of .217 results. This compares to an R2 of .223 (p < .01) when the dummy execution 
variable is considered. Similarly, when the number of executions and the dummy execution 
variable are regressed against the five right-hand factors considered in the homicide analysis, 
significant (p < .01) R2 values of .216 and .220, respectively, result. These R2 values indicate 
that the majority of the variation in each execution measure is not accounted for by any or all 
of the other predictor variables. Accordingly, there is no indication that the findings to be 
presented for the execution variables in Tables 2-10 suffer from problems of multicollinearity. 
In addition, the analysis shows that the other right-hand factors do not suffer from serious 
collinearity problems. 
50 Only during this seven-year period do the annual reports disaggregate homicide figures 
by month and type of killing. 
51 With a few slight exceptions, the types of killings included in the criminal homicide 
data for Chicago are comparable to the types of killings included in the FBI offense category 
of murder and non-negligent manslaughter. &e FBI, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, supra 
note 30, at 61. Excluded from the Chicago homicide data are a few deaths resulting from 
illegal abortions, infant neglect, criminal carelessness with a wagon or automobile, and deaths 
resulting from illegally produced alcohol. In addition, 38 killings resulting from the Chicago 
race riot of 1919 are excluded from the analysis. 
52 E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS, supra note 21, at 212-13, 225; Lehtinen, The 
Value ofLifo: An Argumentfor the .Death Pmal{y, 23 CRIME & DEpNQ. 237, 240-42 (1977); van 
den Haag, On .Deterrence and the .Death Pmal{y, supra note 47, at 143. 
53 E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1949); J. GoRECKI, A THEORY 
3. Execution Variables 
In exammmg monthly first-degree murders and total criminal 
homicides, two execution measures are utilized: (1) the actual number 
of monthly executions, and (2) a dummy execution variable, where exe-
cution months are assigned a weight of one (1.0) and non-execution 
months a weight of zero (0.0).54 If the public, including would-be kill-
ers, is sensitive to the actual volume of executions via the deterrence 
thesis, then the former measure should prove superior to the latter, 
which simply reflects the presence or absence of an execution during a 
month. Both types of measures have been used by previous investigators 
and are considered here for comparative purposes.55 
1. Control Vanables 
The two sociodemographic control variables considered in the anal-
ysis are population density and percent of the city budget expended on 
care (food and shelter) for the homeless and other needy adults and chil-
dren.56 These factors are included in the analysis to control for changes 
in the nature of the Chicago population and socioeconomic conditions 
during the seven-year period. In addition, the population density varia-
ble has the effect of controlling for changes in population size since the 
boundaries of Chicago did not change from 1915 through 1921.57 
Season of the year is also included as a control variable. Investiga-
tions have long found that murder rates are generally higher during the 
summer months and in December. The typical explanation for this pat-
tern is that during the summer months and in December (a holiday 
month) there is a greater level of social intercourse and alcohol con-
OF CRIMINAL jUSTICE (1979); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968); 
F. TANNENBAUM, CRIME AND THE COMMUNITY (1938); P. TAPPAN, CRIME, jUSTICE AND 
CoRRECTION (1960); Andenaes, General Prevention Reviszied: Research and Poli&y Implications, 66 
j. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 338 (1975); Andenaes, The General Preventive E.fftcts ofPunz"shment, 
114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966); Andenaes, General Prevention: Illusion or Reality?, 43 J. CRIM. L. 
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 176 (1952). 
54 Following the type of procedure used by King, supra note 22, executions during the first 
halfof a month were recorded as occurring during the month (month t) and those during the 
second half of a month were recorded as occurring during the next month (month t+ 1). 
Short of weekly or daily data for killings, this is as close as the correspondence between execu-
tions and murders or homicides can be approximated. 
55 From 1915 through 1921 there were 26 executions for first-degree murder in Chicago; 
an average of about one execution every 3.2 months during the 84-month period. 
56 The data for these variables come from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Cen-
sus publications and W. SKOGAN, CHICAGO SINCE 1840: A TIME-SERIES DATA HANDBOOK 
(1976). Monthly figures were linearly interpolated. 
57 Accordingly, it is also not necessary to compute rates for the murder and homicide 
variables since inclusion of the population density factor in the analysis controls for changes 
in population from 1915 through 1921. 
sumption, two factors that contribute to murder.58 To control for this 
possible effect, a seasonal dummy variable was constructed with the 
summer months59 and December assigned a weight of one (1.0) and the 
remaining months a weight of zero (0.0). 
Finally, certainty of arrest and imprisonment for murder are con-
sidered in the analysis as control factors to better isolate the hypothe-
sized deterrent effect of executions. A handful of cross-sectional studies 
of cities and states have found evidence that certainty of arrest and im-
prisonment do have at least some degree of deterrent (and/or in-
capacitative) effect on homicides.60 To control for this possibility for 
Chicago during the period considered, annual certainty of imprison-
ment values for first-degree murder were computed by the following 
formula: certainty= [(No. of imprisonments for murder I I No. of ar-
rests for murder I X 100]. Similarly, when total criminal homicides are 
considered as the dependent variable in the analysis, a broader measure 
of certainty of imprisonment is utilized: certainty= [(No. of imprison-
ments for homicide I No. of arrests for homicide) X 100]. In computing 
these measures, which result in a percent imprisonment figure for each 
year for each type of killing, the few cases where the accused was killed, 
committed suicide before trial, or was sent to a mental hospital rather 
than a penal institution, as well as cases that were pending at the end of 
the year without disposition, were excluded from consideration in com-
puting certainty values.61 
A similar procedure was also followed in computing annual esti-
mates of the certainty of arrest for first-degree murder: certainty = 
[(No. of arrests for murder I I No. murder I killings) X 100]; and the 
certainty of arrest for homicide: certainty= [(No. of arrests for homicide 
I No. of homicides) X 100]. Alternative arrest "clearance rate" figures 
for either type of killings are not available from Chicago Police Depart-
ment records. 
58 E. SUTHERLAND, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINOLOGY 82 (1947).  
59 The summer months are June, July, and August.  
60 Bean & Cushing, Cnimizal HomiCide, .Punishment and .Deterrence: Methodological and Substan­

tive Reconsi'derati'ons, 52 Soc. SCI. Q. 277 (1971); Ehrlich, PartiCipation in Illegitimate Activziz"es: A 
TheoretiCal and EmpiriCal Investigation, 81 J. PoL. EcON. 521 (1973); Gibbs, supra note 11; Gray 
& Martin, .Punishment and.Deterrence: Another Ana!J'sis ofGibbs' .Data, 50 Soc. SCI. Q. 389 (1969); 
Logan, supra note 36; Logan, General.Deterrent E.Jftcts ofImprisonment, 51 Soc. FORCES 64 (1972); 
Tittle & Rowe, supra note 40. 
61 Because monthly arrest and imprisonment data are not available for Chicago for either 
type ofkilling, certainty values had to be computed on a yearly basis and used as estimates for 
each month falling within the year. We do not see using yearly estimates of certainty as 
posing a serious theoretical problem, however, due to the normal delay for those convicted 
(on occasion, as much as a year or more during the period examined) between arrest and 
imprisonment. 
-------
TABLE 1 
ZERO-ORDER CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN THE MODEL: CHICAGO,  
1915-1921  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) First Degree Murder 1.00 .577b .432b .044 .072 -.400b -.150 -.031 -.241a .158 .186 
(2) Criminal Homicide 1.00 -.193 .210 .109 -.179 -.383b -.140 -.145 -.182 -.108 
(3) Population Density 1.00 -.376b .049 -.499b .226a .020 -.426b .448b .453b 
(4) Public Assistance 1.00 .000 -.148 -.442b -.056 .170 -.195 -.162 
(5) Season 1.00 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 -.020 
(6) Prison for Murder 1.00 .466b -.312b .349b -.131 -.161 
(7) Prison for Homicide 1.00 .026 -.095 .207 .156 
(8) Arrest for Murder 1.00 .615b .023 .057 
(9) Arrest for Homicide 1.00 -.141 -.104 
(10) No. of Executions 1.00 .880b 
(11) Executions Dummy 1.00 
Mean 9.02 18.99 14,138.0 1.81 .33 66.71 59.71 80.85 80.86 .32 .23 
S.D. 3.63 5.23 745.1 .17 .47 9.37 8.53 10.85 9.72 .68 .42 
Min. 1.00 6.00 13,235.0 1.60 0.00 51.00 41.00 66.00 65.00 0.00 0.00 
Max. 19.00 36.00 15,648.0 2.11 1.00 84.00 70.00 100.00 97.00 3.00 1.00 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
B. FINDINGS 
Table 1 presents a descriptive profile of the factors included in our 
model as well as the zero-order correlations among the variables. To 
reiterate, our model predicts a significant negative relationship between 
executions and the number of first-degree murders and total criminal 
homicides. Table 2 reports the results of an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) analysis where the number of monthly first-degree murders is re-
gressed against the number of executions, the execution dummy (0/1) 
variable, and the control factors. 
TABLE2 
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS REGRESSED  
AGAINST NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIA- 
BLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F 
Population Density .002 2.547a .002 2.440a 
Public Assistance 3.202 .220 3.169 1.222 
Season .410 .546 .417 .580 
Cert. of Arrest -.033 -.919 -.034 -.935 
Cert. of Prison -.085 -1.591 -.086 -.109 
Executions -.059 -.101 .114 .119 
Constant -14.955 -.874 -13.843 -.803 
R2 .264 4.62b .265 4.62b 
D.W. 1.799 1.804 
* For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, this analysis provides no evi-
dence that executions are an effective deterrent to first-degree murder. 
When the actual number of monthly executions and murders are con-
sidered, these two factors are negatively associated,62 as the deterrence 
hypothesis predicts. The negative relationship is slight, however, and is 
not statistically significant. Moreover, when the execution dummy vari-
able is considered, executions and murders are positively associated.63 
This relationship is also slight, however, and is not statistically 
significant. 
62 B = -.059; t = -.101. 
63 B = .114; t = .119. 
Additionally, Table 2 provides no indication that the certainty of 
arrest or imprisonment are effective deterrents to first-degree murder. 
When both execution measures are considered, the arrest and imprison-
ment coefficients are in the expected negative direction, but they fall 
short of reaching statistical significance at the .05 level. In contrast, 
population density is a significant predictor of murders in each analysis. 
Also of note, the Durbin-Watson (D.W.) statistics allow us to accept 
the null hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation when both the 
number of executions and the execution dummy variable are examined. 
In addition, the same pattern holds when error structures for lag periods 
as far back as t-12 months are considered. Accordingly, it would appear 
that the OLS results reported in Table 2 do not suffer from autocorrela-
tion bias. 
TABLE3 
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST  
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND  
OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
IndeEendent Variables B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.001 -1.640 -.002 -1.932 
Public Assistance .507 .139 .437 .120 
Season 1.309 1.192 1.340 1.217 
Cert. of Arrest -.149 -2.521a -.153 -2.572a 
Cert. of Prison -.210 -3.065b -.216 -3.155b 
Executions -.406 -.470 .442 .753 
Constant 63.236 3.371b 67.897 3.578b 
R2 .238 4.01b .237 3.99b 
D.W. 1.582 1.578 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mu-
litple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
Table 3 reports the analysis where the monthly number of criminal 
homicides is treated as the dependent variable. The findings for the 
execution variables parallel the previous analysis for murder. The 
number of executions is negatively associated with homicides, and the 
execution dummy variable is positively associated with homicides. In 
neither case, however, is the association between these two factors statis-
tically significant. 
Unlike with murder I, both the certainty of arrest and the certainty 
of imprisonment are statistically significant predictors of homicides. Re-
gardless of the execution measure used, the greater the certainty of ar-
rest, the lower the number of homicides. Similarly, the greater the 
certainty of imprisonment, the lower the number of homicides. These 
findings are consistent with what deterrence theory predicts and with 
the findings of some previous studies.64 The significant t values for the 
arrest and imprisonment variables, however, may be to some degree sus-
pect. For both analyses, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicates the pres-
ence of a positive first-order serial correlation that has the effect of 
producing downwardly biased standard errors and, accordingly, up-
wardly biased t ratios. This could account for the significant t values for 
the arrest and imprisonment variables. 
Although our primary concern is with the deterrent effect of execu-
tions and not certainty of arrest and imprisonment, the homicide equa-
tions reported in Table 3 were re-estimated using the Cochrane-Orcutt 
(CORC) iterative procedure for first-order autocorrelation.65 Results 
are reported in Table 4. 
TABLE4 
CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST  
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND  
OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
IndeEendent Variable B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.001 -1.336 -.002 -1.471 
Public Assistance .901 .204 .830 .188 
Season 1.888 1.683a 1.912 1.703a 
Cert. of Arrest -.152 -2.070a -.155 -2.104a 
Cert. of Prison -.210 -2.544b -.215 -2.611b 
Executions -.243 -.311 .215 .170 
Constant 62.074 2.726b 64.896 2.832b 
R2 .275 4.81b .275 4.79b 
D.W. 1.970 1.964 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
64 See, e.g., Bailey, Martin & Gray, Cn"me & Dt:terrence: A Comlation Ana(ysi's, 11 J. RE-
SEARCH CRIME & DELINQ. 124 {1974); Gray & Martin, Punishment and Dt:terrmce: Another Anal­
ysis ofGibbs' Data, 50 Soc. Sci. Q 289 (1969); Logan, General Deterrent E.fftcts ofImprisonment, 51 
Soc. FORCES 64 {1972). 
65 To test and correct for serial correlation problems, the SAS {Statistical Analysis Sys-
This reanalysis does not alter the basic findings for the sanction 
variables. There continues to be only a chance relationship between ex-
ecutions and homicides, and a statistically significant negative relation-
ship between the certainty of arrest and imprisonment and homicides. 
Unlike the findings in Table 3, in Table 4 season becomes a significant 
predictor of homicides, with a larger number of killings in December 
and during the summer months. Although the results vary somewhat 
for the season variable when possible higher-order autocorrelation 
processes are explored,66 the results for the sanction variables are not 
altered. There remains only a chance relationship between executions 
and homicides, and a significant negative relationship between arrest 
and imprisonment and homicides. 
C. THE EFFECT OF LAGGED EXECUTIONS 
Up to this point we have considered solely the relationship between 
executions and first-degree murders and homicides within the same 
month, and the evidence is inconsistent with the deterrence hypothesis. 
It is possible, however, that the deterrent effect of executions is not felt 
primarily during the month of execution, but during the next month, or 
the next few months. Unfortunately, proponents of deterrence theory 
and capital punishment are not explicit about the proper time lag to 
consider in an investigation such as ours. However, if the effect of execu-
tions is delayed, our analysis to this point does not provide an adequate 
test of the deterrence hypothesis. 
To explore this question, we next regress the number of monthly 
(month t) first-degree murders and total criminal homicides against the 
control variables, the number of executions and the execution dummy 
variable for months t through t-12. This analysis takes into considera-
tion the possibility that the deterrent effect of capital punishment may 
not be experienced until as much as twelve months after an execution. 
The results of this analysis for first-degree murder are presented in Ta-
ble 5. 
tern) autoregression (AUTO REG) routine is utilized. This procedure first estimates a model 
using ordinary least squares and then computes autocorrelations up to the lag period re-
quested using the residuals from the OLS regression. The Yule-Walker equations are solved 
to obtain estimates of the autoregressive parameters. Here we explore possible autoregressive 
processes up to lag period t-12 months. Where significant (p < .05) autocorrelations result for 
a lag period, the original data are appropriately transformed and parameters are re-estimated 
using OLS regression. 
66 Months t-2 through t-12. 
TABLES  
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS REGRESSED 
AGAINST LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION 
DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 
1915-1921* 
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
IndeEendent Variables B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.001 -.443 -.000 -.150 
Public Assistance 2.458 .938 2.445 .893 
Season .335 .417 .345 .431 
Cert. of Arrest -.026 -.663 -.037 -.978 
Cert. of Prison -.112 -1.805a -.106 -1.861a 
Executions 
Month t .468 .686 1.089 1.012 
Month t-1 .882 1.168 2.713 2.373a 
Month t-2 -.527 -.696 .836 .712 
Month t-3 -.452 -.574 -.480 -.405 
Month t-4 .750 .885 .317 .257 
Month t-5 .503 .586 .821 .648 
Month t-6 -.673 -.748 -1.076 -.830 
Month t-7 1.302 1.466 .674 .512 
Month t-8 1.086 1.183 .831 .663 
Month t-9 .673 .780 .620 .483 
Month t-10 1.896 2.162a 1.148 .927 
Month t-11 1.206 1.350 -.224 -.172 
Month t-12 .620 .716 .445 .352 
Constant 26.190 .756 17.370 .516 
R2 .388 2.29b .379 2.21b 
D.W. 1.914 1.893 
• 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
Table 5 provides no consistent support for the deterrence hypothe-
sis for capital punishment. When the number of executions is consid-
ered, a minority (3/13) of the execution coefficients are negative and 
none are statistically significant. In contrast, executions and murders 
are positively associated for most lag periods (10), and the positive exe-
cution coefficient is significant for lag period t-10 months.67 
A similar pattern holds when the execution dummy variable is ex-
amined. Again, only a minority (3/13) of the execution coefficients are 
67 B = 1.896; t = 2.162. 
TABLE6 
CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS RE- 
GRESSED AGAINST LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED  
ExECUTION DuMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS;  
CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
Indeeendent Variable B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.002 -1.180 -.001 -.783 
Public Assistance .820 .399 .774 .331 
Season .501 .638 .596 .755 
Cert. of Arrest -.033 -1.113 -.049 -1.558 
Cert. of Prison -.147 -2.983b -.135 -2.775b 
Executions 
Month t .431 .665 .996 .968 
Month t-1 1.112 1.525 2.957 2.636b 
Month t-2 -.379 -.521 1.004 .888 
Month t-3 -.440 -.599 -.443 -.391 
Month t-4 .792 .980 .405 .344 
Month t-5 .663 .790 1.021 .842 
Month t-6 -.450 -.512 -.719 -.583 
Month t-7 1.544 1.811a .964 .774 
Month t-8 1.262 1.430 1.168 .971 
Month t-9 1.037 1.274 .984 .814 
Month t-10 2.198 2.534b 1.527 1.256 
Month t-11 1.653 1.869a .494 .384 
Month t-12 .698 .826 .559 .459 
Constant 48.323 1.700 37.772 1.307 
R2 .509 3.74b .455 3.01b 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
negative, none are statistically significant, and one of the positive execu-
tion coefficients (for t-1) is significant at the .05 level.68 Also, in both 
analyses, the certainty of imprisonment, but not arrest, is significantly 
related to first-degree murders.69 
The Durbin-Watson statistics reported in Table 5 indicate that the 
OLS estimates are not seriously biased due to first-order serial correla-
68 	 B = 2.713; t = 2.373. 
69 There is a high degree of correspondence between the number of monthly executions 
and the execution dummy variables with the simple r coefficients ranging from .88 to .93 for 
the thirteen lag periods. 
TABLE7  
OLS: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST  
LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION DUMMY  
VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921 *  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
IndeEendent Variable B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.008 -2.669b -.007 -2.433b 
Public Assistance -3.429 -.941 -3.485 -.089 
Season 1.531 1.369 1.366 1.194 
Cert. of Arrest -.129 -2.419b -.143 -2.670b 
Cert. of Prison -.338 -3.933b -.326 -4.001b 
Executions 
Month t .123 .130 1.028 .669 
Month t-1 .399 .379 2.340 1.433 
Month t-2 -.906 -.860 .603 .360 
Month t-3 -1.162 -1.061 -1.343 -.793 
Month t-4 1.213 1.029 1.755 .997 
Month t-5 .720 .602 .019 .010 
Month t-6 -.599 -.479 -2.209 -1.193 
Month t-7 2.150 1.741a 1.314 .699 
Month t-8 2.120 1.659 1.374 .768 
Month t-9 3.611 3.010b 4.076 2.223a 
Month t-10 3.413 2.798b 3.032 1.716a 
Month t-11 1.866 1.500 .639 .345 
Month t-12 1.119 .928 1.455 .805 
Constant 172.193 3.572b 156.876 3.262b 
R2 .428 2.70b .389 2.30b 
D.W. 1.912 1.715 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
tion. However, the possible bias resulting from higher order autocorre-
lation effects remains uncertain. To explore this question, lag periods as 
far back as t-12 months were explored and a significant second-order 
autocorrelation effect was detected. Table 6 reports re-estimated equa-
tions for first-degree murder correcting for the second-order autoregres-
sive process. 
This reanalysis does not significantly alter the pattern of findings 
from the OLS procedure. As before, a majority of the coefficients are 
positive when both the actual number of executions (10/13) and the 
execution dummy variable (11/13) are considered. This analysis differs 
TABLE 8  
CORC: NUMBER OF MONTHLY HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST  
LAGGED NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, A LAGGED EXECUTION DUMMY  
VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
No. Executions Execution Dummy 
IndeEendent Variables B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.004 -1.858a -.003 -1.294 
Public Assistance -.036 -.011 3.145 .874 
Season 2.062 1.690a 2.139 1.876a 
Cert. of Arrest -.206 -4.235b -.230 -3.428b 
Cert. of Prison -.171 -2.890b -.115 -1.614 
Executions 
Month t .338 .392 2.433 1.920a 
Month t-1 .248 .248 3.782 2.641b 
Month t-2 -1.394 -1.405 1.518 1.034 
Month t-3 -2.046 -2.033a -1.672 -1.158 
Month t-4 .117 .114 .606 .393 
Month t-5 -.388 -.370 -.545 -.317 
Month t-6 -1.573 -1.411 -2.734 -1.487 
Month t-7 1.096 .959 .120 .065 
Month t-8 1.306 1.133 .664 .395 
Month t-9 2.785 2.576b 2.156 1.278 
Month t-10 3.159 2.651b 1.510 .914 
Month t-11 1.896 1.534 -.752 -.437 
Month t-12 .534 .470 -.141 -.091 
Constant 96.273 3.293b 91.596 2.037a 
R2 .491 3.48b .486 3.41b 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the mul-
tiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
only in that the number of executions is positively and significantly asso-
ciated with the number of first-degree murders for three lag periods (t-7, 
t-10, t-11) rather than just the one (t-10) as found in the OLS analysis. 
Certainty of imprisonment is again significantly associated with first-
degree murders, as it is in the OLS analysis. 
To further explore the possible delayed deterrent effect of execu-
tions, Table 7 reports the results of the analysis where the number of 
monthly criminal homicides is regressed against both execution vari-
ables lagged from month t through month t-12. This analysis also does 
not support the deterrence argument for capital punishment. Both cer-
tainty of arrest and certainty of imprisonment are significantly, and neg-
atively, associated with the number of homicides, but none of the 
negative execution coefficients are statistically significant. As before, the 
vast majority of the execution coefficients are positive (21/26). They are 
statistically significant for three lag periods for the number of executions 
(t-7, t-9, t-10), and for two lag periods for the execution dummy variable 
(t-9, t-10). 
Again, to explore for possible autocorrelation effects, the analysis 
reported in Table 7 for homicide was repeated considering the possibil-
ity of autocorrelation processes ranging from t-1 through t-12 months. 
Surprisingly, and for reasons that are not clear, a significant ninth-order 
autocorrelation effect was detected when both the number of executions 
and the execution dummy factor were considered. 
Table 8 reports the results of the analysis where a Cochrane-Orcutt 
type of iterative procedure was used to correct for the ninth-order 
autocorrelation effect. Comparison of the OLS and the CORC esti-
mates reported in Tables 7 and 8, respectively, reveals a similar pattern 
of findings. When the number of executions is considered, most (9/13) 
of the coefficients are again positive and two (t-9, t-10) are statistically 
significant at the .01level. Interestingly, however, one of the four nega-
tive execution coefficients (t-3) is also statistically significant (p<.05) in 
the CORC analysis. 
When the execution dummy variable is considered, a majority 
(8/13) of the execution coefficients are also positive, and two (months t 
and t-1) are statistically significant. This analysis also continues to sug-
gest the importance of the deterrent effect of arrest and imprisonment. 
D. RESULTS OF A NONLINEAR ANALYSIS 
The results up to this point clearly do not support the deterrence 
hypothesis for capital punishment. Throughout the analysis, executions 
and killings are generally positively associated, and significantly so in 
some cases. In contrast, in only one isolated case-Table 8-is there a 
significant inverse relationship between executions and killings. The 
possibility exists, however, that these generally negative findings are the 
result of improperly specifying the functional form of the relationship 
between executions and the dependent variables. We have considered 
only the possible linear relationship between executions and killings. It 
may be that the actual form of the relationship between these two fac-
tors is nonlinear. Unfortunately, we can only speculate about this be-
cause proponents of the deterrence theory are silent on the question of 
the form of the relationship between executions and killings.70 Typi-
cally, proponents simply argue that executions have a significant deter-
rent effect on murder. 
In exploring this question, previous death penalty investigators 
have examined one of three models of the relationship between execu-
tions and killings: (1) a linear additive model, such as the one used 
here;71 (2) a semi-log model, where the data for the dependent variable 
are transformed;72 or (3) a double-log model, where both the figures for 
the homicide and predictor variables are transformed. 73 These three 
models have generally produced very consistent results. With but two 
noted exceptions,74 neither a significant linear nor nonlinear relation-
ship has been found between executions and homicides. Ehrlich, for ex-
ample, in his time-series analysis of nationally aggregated execution and 
homicide data75 found a statistically significant negative relationship be-
tween these two factors when a double-log model was used, but a non-
significant relationship when the execution and homicide data were 
examined in their original form with a linear model. 
To test for a possible nonlinear relationship between executions and 
murders in Chicago, natural log transforms were performed on the mur-
der and homicide dependent variables and the above analysis (Tables 2-
8) was repeated.76 Table 9 reports the results of the nonlinear analysis 
where the transformed monthly murder and homicide data and both 
execution variables are considered. This analysis is simply a replication 
of that reported in Tables 2 and 3, but with the consideration of trans-
formed murder and homicide figures. 
70 See, e.g., W. BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT {1979); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING 
CRIMINALS, supra note 47; Lehtinen, supra note 52; van den Haag; On Dete"ence, supra note 47. 
7 1 Bowers & Pierce, supra note 17; Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy: A Reconsidera­
tion ofTime-Series Evidence, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 359 (H. Bedau & 
C. Pierce eds. 1976). 
72 Bailey, supra note 1 0; Bailey, Death Penalty for Murder in Ohio, supra note 21; Bailey, Death 
Penalty flr Murder in California, supra note 21; Bailey, Death Penalty in North Carolina, supra note 
21. 
73 Erlich, supra note 14; Ehrlich, supra note 20. 
74 Ehrlich, supra note 14; Yunker, supra note 16. 
75 Ehrlich, supra note 14. 
76 A semi-log model was used here, not a double-log function as in the Ehrlich study, 
because of the number of months (65/84) in the Chicago time series where there were no 
executions. We do not view this as a major limitation, however. First, and obviously, the log 
of zero cannot be taken. Second, when data points have zero values that are theoretically 
meaningful (in this case, no executions), it makes no sense to follow Ehrlich's practice of 
arbitrarily substituting non-zero values for zeroes so that the data can be log-transformed. 
Third, there is no a prion· reason to expect that a double-log function provides a better test of 
the deterrent effect of executions than a semi-log model. In short, a semi-log model seems like 
a reasonable alternative to consider, although we well recognize that it is just one of a number 
of nonlinear functions that might be explored. Without some theoretical rationale, however, 
the mass exploration of alternative nonlinear functions would simply be a fishing expedition. 
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TABLE9 
OLS: LOG NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS AND HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST NUMBER OF  
EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORSj CHICAGO, 1915-1921*  
--·- --- - -
First Degree Murder Results Homicide Results 
No. Executions Execution Dummy No. Executions Execution Dummy 
Independent Variable B t/F B t/f B t/F B t/F 
Population Density .000 1.478 .000 1.383 -.000 -1.963a -.000 -2.291a 
Public Assistance .338 .902 .332 .884 -.042 -.194 -.046 -.216 
Season .017 .154 .018 .166 .058 .905 .061 .936 
Cert. of Arrest -.009 -1.674a -.009 -1.691a -.010 -2.934b -.011 -2.993b 
Cert. of Prison -.014 -1.826a -.014 -1.855a -.013 -3.196b -.013 -3.295b 
Executions .002 .018 .031 .225 -.025 -.490 .032 .392 
Constant .095 .365 1.064 .426 6.045 5.448b 6.357 5.664b 
R2 .193 3.06b .193 3.07b .255 4.39b .254 4.37b 
D.W. 2.064 2.082 1.748 1.746 
I 
• 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the multiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
The results for the sanction variables exactly parallel the earlier 
findings. For first-degree murder, there is a nonsignificant positive rela-
tionship between both execution measures and the dependent variable. 
For homicide, the coefficients are mixed in sign for the two execution 
variables, but regardless of their sign, none are statistically significant. 
In contrast, the certainty of arrest and imprisonment are negatively, and 
significantly, associated with both types of killings when each execution 
measure is considered. 
To test for problems of serial correlation, the analysis reported in 
Table 9 was repeated with autocorrelation processes being explored 
with lags as far back as month t-12. A significant fifth-order autocorre-
lation effect was detected for murder, and a significant fourth-order 
autocorrelation effect for homicide, but corrections for these effects do 
not alter the results for the sanction variables. There remains only a 
low-positive or a low-negative, and chance, relationship between execu-
tions and killings, and a significant negative association between the cer-
tainty of arrest and imprisonment and both dependent variables. 
Table 10 reports the results of the analysis where the possible 
delayed effect of executions is considered using the transformed murder 
and homicide data. This is a replication of the analysis reported in Ta-
bles 5 and 7 but with alternative transformed murder and homicide 
figures. 
For both types of offenses, the findings are similar to the previous 
linear analysis. For murder I, none of the negative execution coefficients 
are statistically significant. In contrast, the number of murders is posi-
tively and significantly associated with the number of executions for one 
lag period (month t-1). Similarly, for homicide, a minority of the execu-
tion coefficients are negative and none are statistically significant. Also 
contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, homicides are positively and sig-
nificantly associated with the number of executions for four lag periods 
(t-7, t-9, t-11, t-12) and the execution dummy variable for two lag peri-
ods (t- 9, t-10). The lag periods for the significant execution results par-
allel the linear analysis. Also consistent with the linear analysis, Table 
10 continues to provide evidence of the deterrent effect of arrest and 
imprisonment for both types of killings. 
The Durbin-Watson values reported in Table 10 suggest that the t-
ratios for the execution and other variables are not seriously biased due 
to first-order serial correlation, but higher-order autocorrelation 
problems remain a possibility. Indeed, examination reveals a significant 
second-order autocorrelation effect in the murder I analysis when each 
execution variable is considered, and a significant fourth-order autocor-
relation effect in the homicide analysis for both execution variables. 
----- --
TABLE 10 
OLS: LOG NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS AND HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST LAGGED  
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-
1921.*  
IFirst Degree Murder Results Homicide Results 
No. Executions Execution Dumm}:: No. Executions Execution Dummy 
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F B t/F B t/F 
Population Density -.000 -.443 -.000 -.415 -.005 -2.629b -.000 2.360a 
Public Assistance .243 .657 .224 .564 -.281 -1.321 -.287 -1.242 
Season -.028 . -.247 -.030 -.259 .068 1.042 .057 .842 
Cert. of Arrest -.008 -1.553 -.010 -1.818a -.010 -3.138b -.011 -3.314b 
Cert. of Prison -.017 -1.986a -.017 -2.076a -.019 -3.886b -.019 -3.903b 
Executions 
Month t .086 .894 .161 1.031 .001 .026 .048 .525  
Month t-1 .138 1.295 .320. 1.924a .017 .280 .102 1.055  
Month t-2 -.168 -1.574 -.039 .227 -.079 -1.268 -.015 -.154  
Month t-3 -.081 -.729 -.058 -.336 -.070 -1.094 .099 -.989  
Month t-4 .122 1.015 .051 .287 .064 .932 .069 .659  
Month t-5 .089 .736 .199 1.080 .041 .592 .016 .149  
Month t-6 -.164 -1.295 -.146 -.777 -.063 -.870 -.150 -1.367  
Month t-7 .183 1.462 .168 .877 .138 1.914a .094 .844  
Month t-8 .131 1.006 .095 .520 .119 1.592 .068 .641  
Month t-9 .113 .926 .134 .719 .209 2.996b .254 2.341a  
Month 1-10 .217 1.748a .202 1.124 .197 2.768b .186 1.775a  
Month t-11 .131 1.036 -.014 -.074 .140 1.927a .087 .789 
TABLE 10 
OLS: LOG NUMBER OF MONTHLY FIRST DEGREE MURDERS AND HOMICIDES REGRESSED AGAINST LAGGED  
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS, AN EXECUTION DUMMY VARIABLE, AND OTHER SELECTED FACTORS; CHICAGO, 1915-
1921.*  
First Degree Murder Results Homicide Results 
No. Executions Execution Dummy No. Executions Execution Dummy 
Independent Variable B t/F B t/F B t/F B t/F 
Month t-12 -.000 -.002 -.058 -.318 .066 .940 .105 .977 
Constant 5.302 1.083 5.208 1.064 12.059 4.293b 11.198 3.929b 
R2 .361 2.04a .316 1.67 .457 3.046b .401 2.41b 
D.W. 	 2.108 2.110 2.083 1.894 
* 	 For the unstandardized regression coefficients (B), t values are reported; for the multiple R2 values, F values are reported. 
a= p < .05 
b = p < .01 
When the four models presented in Table 10 are re-estimated cor-
recting for autocorrelation, the results are equally inconsistent with the 
deterrence hypothesis. Again, only a minority of the execution coeffi-
cients are negative, and none are statistically significant for either first-
degree murder or homicide. For murder I, three of the positive execu-
tion coefficients are statistically significant (t-1, t-7, t-10) and one of the 
execution dummy coefficients is significant (t-1). For homicide, only one 
of the execution dummy coefficients is statistically significant (t-9). Four 
of the coefficients are statistically significant when the number of execu-
tions is considered (t-8, t-9, t-10, t-11). As contrary as these findings are 
to the deterrence hypothesis for executions, the results of this reanalysis 
are quite consistent with the hypothesized deterrent effect of arrest and 
imprisonment. 
To briefly summarize, for the period under investigation, we find 
no evidence that capital punishment provided an effective deterrent to 
first-degree murder in Chicago. Where the deterrence model poses a 
significant inverse relationship between executions and capital killings, 
our analysis shows that these two factors are most commonly positively 
associated. This pattern holds for the linear and nonlinear models for 
both execution measures, and also when the majority of the execution 
lag periods are considered. 
When a more general category of homicide is considered, the results 
are very similar. Although the findings differ somewhat for the linear 
and nonlinear models, the basic pattern is the same, whether the actual 
number of executions or the execution dummy variable is considered. 
Contrary to the deterrence hypothesis, executions are more typically as-
sociated with a higher rather than a lower number of criminal homi-
cides. This positive relationship is statistically significant for some lag 
periods for either or both of the execution measures in the linear 
(months t, t-1, t-7, t-9, t-10) and nonlinear analysis (months t-7, t-8, t-9, 
t-10, t-11). 
E. THE BRUTALIZATION HYPOTHESIS 
On balance, these findings for both murder and homicide seem 
consistent with Bowers and Pierce's claim77 that the effect of executions 
is to increase, not decrease, killings. 78 This argument-that capital pun-
77 Bowers & Pierce, .Deterrence or Brutalization, supra note 21. 
78 Rather than indicating a brutalization effect, the generally positive association between 
executions and both types ofkillings might be interpreted as evidence that the level ofmurder 
has a positive effect on the "demand" for executions. Brier & Fienberg, supra note 17, at 179; 
Friedman, supra note 17, at 69. To illustrate, in Community A, which has a high murder rate, 
fear and public outrage may result in a higher number of convicted murderers being sen-
tenced to death and executed than in Community B, where the murder rate is low and is not 
ishment, because of its "brutalization effect," actually contributes to the 
murder problem-has a long history in the criminology literature.79 
Like the deterrence theory, however, the "brutalization" hypothesis is 
not well developed theoretically. For example, this body of literature is 
virtually silent on such basic matters as the magnitude of the positive 
relationship to expect between executions and resulting homicides, and 
the nature of the temporal relationship-possible lag-between execu-
tions and resulting homicides. Proponents of the brutalization hypothe-
sis are generally no more specific about these two matters than to argue 
that executions encourage more murders than they prevent and that the 
impact of executions is probably immediate and rather short-term.80 
With only such a general theoretical framework to test against, it is 
not altogether clear whether our findings should be interpreted as sup-
porting the brutalization argument. For example, the brutalization the-
ory hypothesizes a positive relationship between executions and killings, 
and this pattern generally holds for our data. However, for both first-
degree murder and total criminal homicides, the execution coefficients 
are negative for some lag periods. 
Second, the size of the positive execution coefficients vary consider-
ably by lag period, and this variation does not correspond to what the 
brutalization argument might lead us to expect. Whereas one might 
predict that the impact of executions on killings would be immediate 
and short-term, the execution coefficients more often tend to be statisti-
cally significant, and slightly larger in size, for the more extended lag 
seen as such a serious problem. Similarly, within the same community over time, changes in 
the level of murder may influence the demand for executions. 
While the "demand for executions" hypothesis is plausible and could produce a positive 
relationship between executions and killings, this argument cannot account for our findings 
for Chicago. Because of the typical delay of at least one year between the commission of a 
murder, conviction, and execution, Bailey,supra note 10, at 1314-15; Ehrlich, supra note 14, at 
407, the demand hypothesis cannot explain the positive relationship between executions and 
killings when both factors are examined for month t (fables 2, 3, 4 and 9). Similarly, it makes 
no sense to argue that the level of homicides during month t could have influenced the level 
of monthly executions during the previous one-year period (fables 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10). 
79 C. BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (1764); L. HAMILTON, MEMOIRS, 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ROBERT RANTOUL, jR. 4 74 (1854); Bowers & Pierce, Dete"ence 
or Brutalization, supra note 21; Diamond, Murder and the Death Pmalljl: A Case Report, in CAPI-
TAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 445 (1976); Glaser, Capital Punishment-Dete"mt or 
Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined Deaths and Penalties, 10 U. TOL. L. REV. 317 (1979); 
Graves, A Doctor Looks at Capzial Punishmmt, 10 J. LaMA LINDAU. ScH. MED. 137 (1956); 
Marx, Capzial Punishment, reprinted iiz L. FEURER, KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS, BA-
SIC WRITINGS IN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY 485 (1959); Solomon, Capzial Punishment as Sui­
cide and as Murder, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 432. 
so Bowers & Pierce, Dett:rrence or Brutalization, supra note 21. The fact that murder rates are 
generally higher in death penalty than abolition states is frequently cited by proponents of 
the brutalization argument as evidence indicating the long-term and cumulative effect of 
capital punishment. 
periods of months t-6 through t-12. That is, for some unknown reason, 
it appears that executions had a more substantial delayed than immedi-
ate brutalization effect on Chicago first-degree murders and criminal 
homicides. 
Finally, the results vary somewhat depending upon whether the ac-
tual number of executions or the execution dummy variable is consid-
ered. For murder I, the dummy variable for month t-1 is positively and 
significantly associated with the number of killings, but this pattern does 
not hold for the actual number of executions lagged by one month. In 
contrast, first-degree murders are significantly and positively associated 
with the actual number of executions when some more distant lag peri-
ods are considered (months t-7, t-10, t-11), but this pattern does not hold 
for the dummy execution variable for these longer time lags. Similarly, 
but to a lesser extent, the findings for the two execution measures are 
also not uniform by lag period when total criminal homicides are 
examined. 
In light of these mixed findings, one might conclude that this analy-
sis also provides no support for the brutalization hypothesis for capital 
punishment. This conclusion would be consistent with Sellin's claim 
that "the death penalty-in law or practice-does not influence homi-
cide death rates,"81 and the findings of a number of studies showing that 
executions and murder are largely independent factors. As discussed 
above, however, most previous investigations are not without serious 
limitations, some of which we have attempted to overcome in this analy-
sis. In addition, the dominant pattern of a positive relationship between 
executions and killings found throughout the analysis cannot be 
ignored. 
If executions and killings were, indeed, simply random events, we 
would expect (1) no association between these two factors, or (2) a slight 
positive or negative relationship between these two factors, due to sam-
pling error, with the positive and negative execution coefficients being 
roughly equal in number, and averaging to zero when summed. This 
hypothetical random pattern of executions and killings does not fit the 
Chicago data. To the contrary, when the findings for first-degree mur-
der are combined from Tables 5, 6 and 10, fifty-eight of seventy-eight 
(74.4%) of the execution coefficients are positive. Similarly, for criminal 
homicide, fifty-nine of seventy-eight (75.6%) of the execution coefficients 
are positive. For both first-degree murder and ·homicide the number of 
positive execution coefficients is significantly different from chance at 
beyond the .01 level. 
Furthermore, the observed positive and negative execution coeffi-
81 T. SELLIN, supra note 3, at 138. 
cients do not sum to zero for either type of killing for either of the execu-
tion measures. When first-degree murder and the number of executions 
are considered over the thirteen lag periods (Table 5), the execution co-
efficients sum to +7.734. The execution dummy coefficients sum to 
+7.714 for the thirteen lag periods for murder I. For homicide (Table 
7), when the number of executions are considered, the coefficients sum 
to +14.067 over the thirteen lag periods. For homicide for the dummy 
execution variable, the thirteen coefficients sum to + 14.083. These im-
balances in a positive direction are beyond what one would expect if 
executions and killings were simply random events. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
It is conceivable that there is at least some degree of merit to both 
the deterrence and brutalization arguments for capital punishment. To 
some degree, and for some segment of the population, executions may 
deter killings. Conversely, to some degree, and for some other segment 
of the population, executions may encourage killings. In other words, at 
the same time that executions may encourage some persons to kill, they 
may discourage others from committing murder. 
To differentiate the possible deterrent and brutalization effects of 
capital punishment, it is necessary to (1) develop independent indicators 
of the deterrent and brutalization effects of executions rather than sim-
ply rely upon the overall number or rate of killings as a dependent vari-
able, and/or (2) try to identify sub-segments of the population that are 
differentially affected by executions due to deterrence and brutalization, 
and then examine their differential involvement in murder. Due to data 
constraints and the crude nature of both the deterrence and brutaliza-
tion arguments, such an analysis is not possible at this time. Despite this 
limitation, however, one can still legitimately ask: What is the net ejfoct 
of executions on killings? Overall, is the effect of executions to increase 
or decrease killings? And, in the context of the current study, was the 
effect of executions to increase or decrease Chicago killings? 
In line with the brutalization argument, this analysis suggests that 
the net effect of executions may well have been to increase, not decrease, 
Chicago first-degree murders and total criminal homicides. This finding 
is consistent with a number of early and more recent investigations of 
the brutalization effect of capital punishment in this country82 and is 
only partially at odds with one study.83 In addition, our findings are 
82 Bowers & Pierce, Deterrt:nc~ or Brutalization, supra note 21; Graves, supra note 79; King, 
supra note 21; Savitz, A Stzu:fy in Capital Punishment, 49 J. GRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE 
Sci. 338 (1958). 
83 Phillips reported that the initial effect of the highly publicized execution of two dozen 
notorious London murderers (1875-1905) was to reduce killings, which was then balanced by 
consistent with the fact that not a single reputable study has yet shown 
that capital punishment is an effective deterrent to murder. Deterrence 
may indeed be an indispensable cornerstone of our criminal justice sys-
tem, but when it comes to murder and capital punishment, this theory 
and justification for punishment lacks empirical support. 
an unusual increase in murders, for a net effect of close to zero. Phillips, The .Deterrent E.ffict of 
Capital Punishment: New Eviaence on an Old Controversy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139, 147 (1980). Because 
Phillips chose to examine only very atypical killers whose executions received inordinate me-
dia attention, it remains unclear how well his findings can be generalized to more typical 
offenders and executions, even in London. Furthermore, Phillips well recognizes that, for a 
variety of theoretical and methodological reasons, his findings may not be generalizable to 
contemporary America. 
